Publications
1.
Festag, A.; Papadimitratos, P.; Tielert, T.
Design and Performance of Secure Geocast for Vehicular Communication Journal Article
In: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 59, no. 5, pp. 2456-2471, 2010.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: security, V2X communication
@article{Festag:TVT:2010,
title = {Design and Performance of Secure Geocast for Vehicular Communication},
author = {A. Festag and P. Papadimitratos and T. Tielert},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5431029},
doi = {10.1109/TVT.2010.2045014},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-03-15},
urldate = {2010-03-15},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology},
volume = {59},
number = {5},
pages = {2456-2471},
abstract = {The characteristics of vehicular communication environments and their networking and application requirements have led to the development of unique networking protocols. They enable vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication based on the IEEE 802.11 technology, ad hoc principles, and wireless multihop techniques using geographical positions. These protocols, which are commonly referred to as Geocast, greatly support the vehicular communication and applications but necessitate a tailored security solution that provides the required security level with reasonable processing and protocol overhead, as well as reasonably priced onboard and road-side unit equipment. In this paper, we present the design of a security solution for Geocast, which is based on cryptographic protection, plausibility checks using secure neighbor discovery and mobility-related checks, trustworthy neighborhood assessment, and rate limitation. We analyze the achieved security level of the proposed scheme and assess its overhead and performance. Furthermore, we develop a software-based prototype implementation of a secure vehicular communication system. We find that the proposed security measures could result in a network performance bottleneck in realistic vehicular scenarios. Finally, we analyze the tradeoff between security overhead and protocol performance and determine the minimal processing overhead needed for acceptable performance.},
keywords = {security, V2X communication},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The characteristics of vehicular communication environments and their networking and application requirements have led to the development of unique networking protocols. They enable vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication based on the IEEE 802.11 technology, ad hoc principles, and wireless multihop techniques using geographical positions. These protocols, which are commonly referred to as Geocast, greatly support the vehicular communication and applications but necessitate a tailored security solution that provides the required security level with reasonable processing and protocol overhead, as well as reasonably priced onboard and road-side unit equipment. In this paper, we present the design of a security solution for Geocast, which is based on cryptographic protection, plausibility checks using secure neighbor discovery and mobility-related checks, trustworthy neighborhood assessment, and rate limitation. We analyze the achieved security level of the proposed scheme and assess its overhead and performance. Furthermore, we develop a software-based prototype implementation of a secure vehicular communication system. We find that the proposed security measures could result in a network performance bottleneck in realistic vehicular scenarios. Finally, we analyze the tradeoff between security overhead and protocol performance and determine the minimal processing overhead needed for acceptable performance.
2.
Gerlach, M.; Festag, A.; Leinmüller, T.; Goldacker, G.; Harsch, C.
Security Architecture for Vehicular Communication Proceedings Article
In: International Workshop on Intelligent Transportation (WIT), Hamburg, Germany, 2007.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: security, V2X communication
@inproceedings{Gerlach:WIT:2007,
title = {Security Architecture for Vehicular Communication},
author = {M. Gerlach and A. Festag and T. Leinmüller and G. Goldacker and C. Harsch},
url = {https://festag-net.de/wp-content/uploads/2007_Gerlach_WIT.pdf},
year = {2007},
date = {2007-03-20},
urldate = {2007-03-20},
booktitle = {International Workshop on Intelligent Transportation (WIT)},
address = {Hamburg, Germany},
abstract = {Despite recent progress for vehicular communication in research, development, field tests, and standardization, security is still in an early phase though it represents a crucial part of the vehicular communication system. So far, no vehicular security architecture has been proposed which integrates existing individual solutions for vehicle registration, data integrity, authentication, and so on. By description of different architectural perspectives, we identify the stakeholders and their responsibilities. Then, we focus on the functional layer view and highlight the concepts which jointly secure the vehicular communication. Based on these concepts, we present an implementation approach which introduces the security concepts into the protocol stack of a vehicular communication system. The proposed security architecture follows a clean and modular design. It is the basis for our prototype implementation which will serve as a proof-of-concept. We will also submit this architecture to the ongoing standardization process of the Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC).},
keywords = {security, V2X communication},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Despite recent progress for vehicular communication in research, development, field tests, and standardization, security is still in an early phase though it represents a crucial part of the vehicular communication system. So far, no vehicular security architecture has been proposed which integrates existing individual solutions for vehicle registration, data integrity, authentication, and so on. By description of different architectural perspectives, we identify the stakeholders and their responsibilities. Then, we focus on the functional layer view and highlight the concepts which jointly secure the vehicular communication. Based on these concepts, we present an implementation approach which introduces the security concepts into the protocol stack of a vehicular communication system. The proposed security architecture follows a clean and modular design. It is the basis for our prototype implementation which will serve as a proof-of-concept. We will also submit this architecture to the ongoing standardization process of the Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC).
3.
Fonseca, E.; Festag, A.; Baldessari, R.; Aguiar, R.
Support of Anonymity in VANETs – Putting Pseudonymity into Practice Proceedings Article
In: IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), Hong Kong, 2007.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: security, V2X communication
@inproceedings{Fonseca:WCNC:2007,
title = {Support of Anonymity in VANETs – Putting Pseudonymity into Practice},
author = {E. Fonseca and A. Festag and R. Baldessari and R. Aguiar},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4224870},
doi = {10.1109/WCNC.2007.625},
year = {2007},
date = {2007-03-11},
urldate = {2007-06-04},
booktitle = {IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC)},
address = {Hong Kong},
abstract = {Despite great advantages of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), they also introduce challenges with respect to security and privacy. Today, people are more and more concerned about their privacy. Using unique identifiers for communication, a vehicle can easily be located and tracked. Alternatively, a technical solution to protect drivers' privacy is the use of changing pseudonyms. Existing work mainly focuses on algorithms for pseudonym change and neglect practical implications and realizability. For deployment and integration of pseudonymity into a VANET communication system, several issues need to be solved. This paper analyzes the practical challenges and proposes protocol- and implementation-related solutions necessary to turn pseudonymity support into practice. Finally, the paper concludes by means of analysis and measurements that the burden of pseudonymity can be alleviated at reasonable costs and compromises in anonymity support.},
keywords = {security, V2X communication},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Despite great advantages of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), they also introduce challenges with respect to security and privacy. Today, people are more and more concerned about their privacy. Using unique identifiers for communication, a vehicle can easily be located and tracked. Alternatively, a technical solution to protect drivers' privacy is the use of changing pseudonyms. Existing work mainly focuses on algorithms for pseudonym change and neglect practical implications and realizability. For deployment and integration of pseudonymity into a VANET communication system, several issues need to be solved. This paper analyzes the practical challenges and proposes protocol- and implementation-related solutions necessary to turn pseudonymity support into practice. Finally, the paper concludes by means of analysis and measurements that the burden of pseudonymity can be alleviated at reasonable costs and compromises in anonymity support.
4.
Armknecht, F.; Festag, A.; Westhoff, D.; Zeng, K.
Cross-Layer Privacy Enhancement and Non-Repudiation in Vehicular Communication Proceedings Article
In: 4th Workshop on Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (WMAN), Bern Switzerland, 2007.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: security, V2X communication
@inproceedings{Armknecht:WMAN:2007,
title = {Cross-Layer Privacy Enhancement and Non-Repudiation in Vehicular Communication},
author = {F. Armknecht and A. Festag and D. Westhoff and K. Zeng},
url = {https://festag-net.de/wp-content/uploads/2007_Armknecht_WMAN.pdf},
year = {2007},
date = {2007-03-01},
urldate = {2007-03-01},
booktitle = {4th Workshop on Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (WMAN)},
address = {Bern Switzerland},
abstract = {We propose a security architecture that provides two fundamental security services for VANETs: i) non-repudiation and ii) privacy enhancement. Due to a new PKI concept, referred to as PKI+, users are autonomous in deriving public keys, certificates and pseudonyms which minimizes the communication to the certificate authority. Security techniques are supported on all layers of the protocol stack. In particular we show how to link the PKI+ concepts to solutions for routing in vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication.},
keywords = {security, V2X communication},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
We propose a security architecture that provides two fundamental security services for VANETs: i) non-repudiation and ii) privacy enhancement. Due to a new PKI concept, referred to as PKI+, users are autonomous in deriving public keys, certificates and pseudonyms which minimizes the communication to the certificate authority. Security techniques are supported on all layers of the protocol stack. In particular we show how to link the PKI+ concepts to solutions for routing in vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication.
5.
Aijaz, A.; Bochow, B.; Dötzer, F.; Festag, A.; Gerlach, M.; Leinmüller, T.; Schäfer, M.
Attacks on Inter Vehicle Communication Systems – an Analysis Proceedings Article
In: International Workshop on Intelligent Transportation (WIT), pp. 189–194, Hamburg, Germany, 2006.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: security, V2X communication
@inproceedings{Aijaz:WIT:2006,
title = {Attacks on Inter Vehicle Communication Systems – an Analysis},
author = {A. Aijaz and B. Bochow and F. Dötzer and A. Festag and M. Gerlach and T. Leinmüller and M. Schäfer},
url = {https://festag-net.de/wp-content/uploads/2006_Aijaz_WIT.pdf},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-03-14},
urldate = {2006-03-14},
booktitle = {International Workshop on Intelligent Transportation (WIT)},
pages = {189–194},
address = {Hamburg, Germany},
abstract = {Inter-vehicle communication systems are a new paradigm of networking. Largely related to mobile ad hoc networks and their distributed, self-organizing structure, they also introduce new threats. In order to assess these threats we introduce a model of attacks on an inter-vehicle communication system in this paper. This model is used to refine the system model of the NoW communication system and to find potential weaknesses during the specification phase of the NoW communication system. Our work shows that there are several interesting new challenges requiring novel solutions, some of which are outlined at the end of this paper. Although this is still work in progress, it is the foundation for analysis and assessment of future work. As one of the main results of this paper, we identified several difficult to detect attacks on the hard- and software, and on the sensor input. We further point out system requirements to thwart such attacks.},
keywords = {security, V2X communication},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Inter-vehicle communication systems are a new paradigm of networking. Largely related to mobile ad hoc networks and their distributed, self-organizing structure, they also introduce new threats. In order to assess these threats we introduce a model of attacks on an inter-vehicle communication system in this paper. This model is used to refine the system model of the NoW communication system and to find potential weaknesses during the specification phase of the NoW communication system. Our work shows that there are several interesting new challenges requiring novel solutions, some of which are outlined at the end of this paper. Although this is still work in progress, it is the foundation for analysis and assessment of future work. As one of the main results of this paper, we identified several difficult to detect attacks on the hard- and software, and on the sensor input. We further point out system requirements to thwart such attacks.
6.
Festag, A.; Girao, J.; Melia, T.; Westhoff, D.
On the Limitations of Security Concepts for Mobile Adhoc Networks Routing Protocols Proceedings Article
In: vonKnop, J.; Haverkamp, W.; Jessen, E. (Ed.): DFN-Arbeitstagung über Kommunikationsnetze, pp. 61-76, Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V., Düsseldorf, Germany, 2004.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: security, V2X communication
@inproceedings{Festag:DFNArbeitstagung:2004,
title = {On the Limitations of Security Concepts for Mobile Adhoc Networks Routing Protocols},
author = {A. Festag and J. Girao and T. Melia and D. Westhoff},
editor = {J. vonKnop and W. Haverkamp and E. Jessen},
url = {https://festag-net.de/wp-content/uploads/2004_Festag_DFNArbeitstagung.pdf},
year = {2004},
date = {2004-06-01},
urldate = {2004-06-01},
booktitle = {DFN-Arbeitstagung über Kommunikationsnetze},
pages = {61-76},
publisher = {Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V.},
address = {Düsseldorf, Germany},
abstract = {Recently, a number of approaches proposing various security aspects for routing protocols in mobile ad hoc networks have been proposed. In this work we do not introduce another proposal aiming at security in the context of ad hoc networks. Instead, we argue from a generalized view and answer the question: what security objectives are in principle achievable and what security features are not achievable at all, even when using unacceptable heavy weighted security features. Our contribution in this work is to derive from the available security mechanisms and from a reasonable ad hoc network specific attacker model a set of theoretically achievable security objectives. In particular we will also denote the majority of non practically achievable security objectives.},
keywords = {security, V2X communication},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Recently, a number of approaches proposing various security aspects for routing protocols in mobile ad hoc networks have been proposed. In this work we do not introduce another proposal aiming at security in the context of ad hoc networks. Instead, we argue from a generalized view and answer the question: what security objectives are in principle achievable and what security features are not achievable at all, even when using unacceptable heavy weighted security features. Our contribution in this work is to derive from the available security mechanisms and from a reasonable ad hoc network specific attacker model a set of theoretically achievable security objectives. In particular we will also denote the majority of non practically achievable security objectives.